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One of the points of convergence among the many strands of the A2K movement 
is resistance to the one-size-fits-all ratcheting up of intellectual property provi-
sions around the world. The resistance is grounded in analysis showing that intel-
lectual property rules often create social costs that far outweigh their intended 
benefits. Much of the A2K movement’s advocacy for limitations of intellectual 
property rights is located within the field of intellectual property law—promoting 
the inclusion and use of balancing mechanisms within the laws granting intellec-
tual property rights. But intellectual property rights are also shaped and limited by 
their interaction with other fields of law, competition law being a prime example.
 Competition laws, often referred to as “antimonopoly” or “antitrust” laws, 
regulate the conduct of firms that face insufficient competition and thereby have 
the power to raise prices charged to consumers. Intellectual property laws, on the 
other hand, grant rights to exclude competition from the subject matter of the 
intellectual property right to create incentives to invent and produce new products 
for consumers. The rights to exclude competition that are at the core of intellec-
tual property rights may create the ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct of 
the kind normally regulated by competition laws. In such instances, policy makers 
and enforcement agencies are called upon to determine the extent of interaction 
between the two legal regimes. This determination plays a central role in defining 
the limit of intellectual property rights and thus is an important site of legal advo-
cacy for access-to-knowledge movements.
 The argument of what follows is that competition law can and should be used 
to promote the goals of access to knowledge. It is a common misconception that 
competition laws and intellectual property laws are in irreconcilable conflict, 
necessitating blanket exclusions of intellectual property from competition-law reg-
ulation. Competition and intellectual property laws serve similar ends: increasing 




economic productivity and access to new goods. It is only when intellectual prop-
erty protections fail to serve the end of net increases in economic productivity, for 
example by creating more barriers to access to current technology and production 
than they create incentives for additional innovation and creation, that competi-
tion law justifiably limits intellectual property rights. In such cases, there is a long 
history in the United States and other countries of using competition law, includ-
ing enforcing duties to share access with potential competitors, to limit consumer 
harm from excesses practiced by holders of intellectual property rights and other 
property holders. A key example is when intellectual property rights in developing 
countries prohibit competition in the supply of goods such as essential medicines 
or access to information essential to the social or economic development of a coun-
try. In such instances, profit-maximizing actions taken by the holders of exclusive 
intellectual property rights will cause far more consumer harm through restricted 
access than they benefit consumers in the form of incentives for future innovation.
Anti-Monopoly game developed by Ralph Anspach (http://www.antimonopoly.com/).
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	 A2K advocates are using competition law to limit the scope of intellectual 
property rights, including in cases that lay the groundwork for implementing a 
more robust theory of intellectual property. Their work is shifting the question of 
whether competition law can limit intellectual property rights to when competi-
tion law should regulate intellectual property, making it possible to recognize a 
new category of “essential intellectual property” for which open-licensing duties 
should be frequently required. After describing the theoretical and doctrinal 
underpinnings of this shift of A2K legal advocacy toward the use of completion 
law, this part surveys some of the strategic advantages of using competition norms 
to reframe political debates and shift struggles into new, potentially more hospi-
table, forums.
the	intellectual	property/competition	interface
On the surface, the misconception that intellectual property and competition laws 
are locked in interminable conflict seems plausible. Intellectual property laws 
grant rights to exclude competition with the rights holder to create incentives and 
rewards for innovation, including through higher prices to consumers. Competition 
laws prohibit anticompetitive conduct that creates or abuses a lack of competition 
in the market to the detriment of consumer interests. Taken at this superficial level, 
every act to obtain and profit from an intellectual property right could be con-
strued as an act of monopolization in violation of competition law mandates. How-
ever, this view of competition and intellectual property laws has been rejected by 
courts and enforcement agencies in the United States, Europe, and other countries. 
In such jurisdictions, competition law is used, explicitly or implicitly, as a policy 
tool to restrict the scope of intellectual property rights without negating them.
	 Modern competition statutes regulating the use and abuse of monopoly power 
are of fairly recent vintage, the first such statute being the U.S. Sherman Act of 
1890.1 But the history of circumscribing grants of monopoly privileges with social 
duties that restrain excessive pricing and other abuses dates back much further.
 When King Edward’s quo warranto campaign in the thirteenth century first 
required a “letter patent” as proof of a valid exclusive marketing franchise,2 a 
central purpose was to regulate those who “take outrageous Toll, contrary to the 
common Custom of the Realm.”3 Complaints of excessive pricing and other vio-
lations of a duty of “reasonable use” could be brought before the king’s courts 
and were grounds for forfeiture of the franchise. Duties to serve public interests 
were included in the patent grants themselves, which “often required the patentee 
to produce goods of a certain quality and sell them within certain price limits.”4 
The seventeenth-century Statute of Monopolies authorizing letters patent for new 
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inventions, but banning most other franchises, stated the condition that “they be 
not contrary to the Laws nor mischievous to the State, by raising the prices of 
Commodities at home.”5
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, duties for patent holders 
to serve the greater public interest took various forms. The Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, the first major international treaty 
on patent standards, instructed that “the patentee shall remain bound to work his 
patent in conformity with the laws of the country into which he introduces the 
patented objects.”6 Many countries included within their patent laws general pub-
lic-interest grounds for compulsory licensing when a patentee has failed to meet 
the country’s demand for the particular item on “reasonable terms.” The United 
States was different in this regard. Unlike most other countries, it does not have 
a general public-interest compulsory license standard. Public-interest grounds for 
compulsory licensing and for otherwise limiting the scope of exclusive intellec-
tual property rights instead have been developed in major part through the then 
uniquely American institution of competition law.
 For the first decades after the U.S. Congress passed the Sherman Act of 1890, 
courts largely interpreted it as placing little restraint on the practices of intellec-
tual property holders. It was commonly considered that the right to exclude oth-
ers from use of a creation included a right to refuse to license the technology to 
others and a correlative right to impose unlimited restrictions on the licenses that 
the holder chose to issue. It was common, for example, for patent and copyright 
holders to impose minimum price requirements and resale restrictions in intellec-
tual property licenses. Over time, this reasoning lost favor, and a large number of 
restrictive licensing practices, including minimum-pricing and resale restrictions, 
tying patent licenses to purchases of other products, and charging royalties not 
strictly related to the use of the patented technology, were deemed to be beyond 
the scope of the patent grant and prohibited by competition law.7 The reach of 
antitrust law in this area is commonly said to have peaked in the 1970s with U.S. 
enforcement agencies’ use of a “Nine No-No’s” list of intellectual property licens-
ing practices deemed to be per se illegal.8
 Courts often frame the legal analysis as discovering a core of intellectual prop-
erty rights immune from competition law scrutiny, with the right to exclude others 
through refusals to license often considered the heart of the core, surrounded by 
a periphery of restrictive licensing practices regulated by competition law. Courts 
thus answer the question of whether a particular restrictive practice is prohibited 
by examining whether it is within the “scope of the patent”9 and contributes to the 
“reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure”10 or is 
outside the scope of the grant and by its “very nature illegal.”11
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 The line between core and periphery has shifted dramatically over time, and 
several recent cases in the U.S. and Europe have discarded much of the core/
periphery analysis altogether. Some recent cases use use instead competition doc-
trines to force the sharing of intellectual property in particular cases. These cases 
in effect transform the core of intellectual property rights from a right to exclude 
to a liability rule giving the rights holder compensation for use by others.
 The genealogy of duties to license leads back to doctrines in real property law. 
The right to exclude others from the use of real property has long been considered 
the core of the property right. But competition law has nevertheless been used to 
invade that core in a number of special circumstances. In a series of cases deal-
ing with the ownership of unique infrastructure resources that are necessary to 
enable competition, from the only bridge across a river,12 to electricity and tele-
phone wires needed to promote utility service competition,13 U.S. courts have 
propounded what has become known as the “essential facilities doctrine.” This 
doctrine orders companies to share “access to their unique facilities, even to com-
petitors, on a nondiscriminatory basis where sharing is feasible and the competi-
tors cannot obtain or create the facility on their own.”14 U.S. and European courts 
have begun applying this doctrine to refusals of intellectual property owners to 
license their rights in special cases.
 In the United States, the application of competition law standards to force the 
licensing of important intellectual property is highly controversial. However, the 
former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, a primary competition law 
enforcement body, has argued that U.S. antitrust law can and should impose anti-
trust liability for a monopolist’s refusal to licence intellectual property, just “as with 
any other kind of property, tangible or intangible . . . shown to constitute an essen-
tial facility.”15 And a small number of courts have concluded that a refusal to license 
intellectual property may violate antitrust law where the refusal does not suffi-
ciently serve the purposes of intellectual property law in promoting new creation or 
innovation.16 Yet an important appellate court for patent law questions has held that 
such theories may not be pursued and that courts instead are restricted to regulating 
practices that lie outside of the core right to exclude granted by the patent.17
 By contrast, legal limits on the refusal to license in intellectual property mat-
ters are relatively well established in Europe. In one lead case, referred to as 
Magill,18 three television broadcasters held copyrights on their respective listings 
for broadcasts in Ireland and refused to give permission for any firm to produce a 
comprehensive weekly guide combining the listings. European courts struck down 
the refusal to license, holding that the exclusion justified compulsory licensing 
because it prevented “the appearance of a new product . . . which the appellants did 
not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand.”19 In another lead 
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case, European courts ordered compulsory licensing of a copyrighted data tool that 
had become an industry standard and that prevented any other firm from compet-
ing in the same market.20
applying	competition	law	to	intellectual	property	issues
Although many courts and commentators continue to engage in core/periphery 
thinking and attempt to define sets of practices inside and outside the central 
scope of the patent, the shifting boundaries between core and periphery over time 
and between countries expose the policy-laden nature of the task. Competition 
law can be used to limit intellectual property rights, including invading the core 
of the rights and prohibiting refusals to license others. Thus, the key question for 
policy advocates and enforcement officials is when competition law should limit 
intellectual property rights.
 Many modern experts seek to answer the question of when competition 
law should restrict intellectual property rights by means of an explicit balanc-
ing of the costs and benefits of a particular practice. An influential article by 
Harvard Law School professor Louis Kaplow, for example, argues that enforce-
ment officials should determine whether to use competition law to regulate 
a particular practice by reference to the net benefit or harm to society that the 
restrictive practice is causing.21 According to this line of thinking, the social ben-
efit of allowing intellectual property holders to engage in restrictive practices is 
that by raising their ability to profit from the intellectual property, the restric-
tive practices may increase incentives to innovate and create new products for 
future consumers. The costs of a restrictive practice may be decreased access to 
the existing technology, as well as other dynamic costs from limiting the diffu-
sion of information and erecting barriers to follow-on innovation. The lead-
ing treatise on intellectual property law and competition in the United States 
similarly describes the question as calling for “balancing the social benefit of 
providing economic incentives for creation and the costs of limiting diffusion 
of knowledge.”22
 In the period before implementation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements, including the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement imposing minimum standards on intellectual property laws 
and terms, countries could respond to a situation where the costs of intellectual 
property restrictions far exceeded their benefits by shortening the term of years 
when the restrictions on intellectual property rights could be exploited or by doing 
away with intellectual property in the particular field of technology. Those options 
are no longer available to WTO members, who must grant intellectual property 
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rights in all industries, without discrimination and for minimum terms. But under 
TRIPS, countries may accomplish the same effects by using competition law to 
reduce the scope of restrictive practices that may be engaged in during the period. 
By allowing the use of competition mandates, TRIPS offers countries considerable 
flexibility to adjust both the costs and the benefits of intellectual property restric-
tions.23 The two policy tools are interrelated: “The amount of reward provided and 
the monopoly loss arising in each additional year in which exploitation is permit-
ted (and thus the appropriate length of patent life) depend on what practices pat-
entees may employ during that time period.”24
 Using cost-benefit balancing tests, the interface of competition and intellectual 
property law in a country generally or for a particular industry or practice can be 
charted along a spectrum. At one end, the most dominant competition laws invade 
the core of intellectual property rights with enforceable duties to license competi-
tors under the “essential facility” and related doctrines. At the other end, the most 
dominant intellectual property rights grant owners nearly total exemption from 
competition mandates. If restrictive practices cause particularly egregious social 
harm while creating relatively slight increases in reward to the intellectual prop-
erty rights holder, then an expansion of the realm of competition law in restrict-
ing intellectual property rights is a WTO-compliant policy measure justified by 
the purposes of each doctrine. As described below, economic analysis suggests 
that the application of intellectual property law to essential goods and services in 
developing countries with high income inequality is just such a situation.25
the	economics	of	exclusion
Just as there are public and consumer interests served by the recognition in com-
petition law of the existence of “essential facilities” and the attendant doctrine 
requiring the sharing of some real property among competitors, public interests 
can be served by the recognition of the existence of what may be called “essential 
intellectual property” for which enforcement of exclusionary rights demonstrably 
and predictably causes far more social harm that it creates benefits. The fact that 
intellectual property rights are granted for essential goods and services in a highly 
unequal society is a key example of intellectual property becoming essential in 
this regard. In such a situation, as described more fully below, the legal right cre-
ates rational economic incentives to price the vast majority of consumers out of 
access. This lack of access, in turn, creates demonstrable losses to society that far 
exceed the minimal incentives to innovate that the owner of intellectual property 
receives for engaging in the socially harmful activity. Using the basic policy bal-
ance between costs and benefits articulated by modern commentators, it becomes 
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eminently justifiable to apply the strongest competition law and other duties to 
share such essential intellectual property.
 Monopoly economics teaches that profit-maximizing monopolists will serve 
a smaller segment of the consumer population (limiting output) at a higher price 
than would be the case under a competitive market. Absent some form of govern-
ment price regulation or threat of entry by competitors, the only restraint on the 
monopoly’s pricing will be a function of the willingness and ability of consumers 
to pay higher prices. The rational monopolist will keep raising prices until so many 
people cannot or will not pay the price that the loss of consumers eats into the 
firm’s aggregate profits.
 Economists illustrate the effect of consumer demand choices on monopolist 
pricing behavior through the shape and slope of a demand curve. A flat horizontal 
demand curve (see figure 1) would indicate that the seller has no discretion to raise 
prices. A small price increase would lead to all consumers foregoing purchases. 
Take, for example, a commodity such as wheat being sold at an exchange with a 
nearly infinite number of buyers and sellers. In such a market, the demand curve 
will be essentially flat—a small raise in price by a seller would result in all buyers 
shifting to another seller. Nearly flat demand curves also result when there is very 
limited discretionary income in a market, so that a small price increase will exclude 
all buyers from the market.
 A vertical demand curve would yield no restraint on prices at all, referred 
to as a perfectly inelastic market (see figure 2). Consumers will purchase the 
amount of goods they require, regardless of the price set. Necessities without 
substitutes, such as utilities, food staples, and fuel, tend to be very inelastic, at 
least in the short run. One real-world example is the behavior of some electric-
ity markets in the U.S. during the so-called “Enron scandal.” The problem with 
markets that Enron and other companies exploited was that at certain times when 
energy demand is particularly high (for example, hot days in the summer), demand 
reaches the limits of supply, but cannot decrease on a short-term basis. The elec-
tricity producers thus achieve nearly absolute market power—they can charge any 
price they want without demand decreasing. During some of these crises, there 
were reports of electricity sales that cost $35 per unit the day or hour before spik-
ing up past $10,000 per unit.26
 Demand curves have a shape, as well as a slope. The shape of the curve is affected 
by how different consumers react to a price increase. If there is a large group of con-
sumers that is very price sensitive and another group that is very price insensitive, 
then the curve will have a convex character, with part of it approaching vertical and 
another part nearly horizontal. This, too, will affect pricing behavior. If the number 
of consumers in the steeper section of the curve is large enough and willing to pay 
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high enough prices, then the monopolist may make more money by serving only 
that segment of the population than by serving all of the potential demand.
 If a monopoly-provided good is an essential product with no substitutes, peo-
ple will be willing to pay a very high portion of their income to enjoy access to 
it. Thus, the real restraint on pricing will be a function of ability to pay. This, in 
turn, means that the shape and slope of the demand curve will be a function of 
how income is distributed in a given society. In countries with very high income 
inequality, with a small number of superrich people living on First World incomes 
and a large number of superpoor people with very little discretionary income, the 
demand curve will be highly convex. And this will predictably lead to the monopo-
list pricing to the nearly vertical section of the curve, where large price increases 
can be implemented with very little additional loss of sales.
figure 1 Perfectly elastic 
demand curve.
















 Consider the case of South Africa, a country among the worst in terms of 
income inequality. Figure 3 is a demand curve constructed according to the 
assumption that people needing AIDS treatment in South Africa will purchase 
an antiretroviral if the cost is 5 percent of their income. If a firm prices its anti-
retroviral at $1,481 per patient per year, 100,000 people in the top income decile 
will buy it. In order to sell to a greater proportion of the population, the price 
must fall considerably—200,000 people with HIV/AIDS will buy the medicine if 
it is priced at $396, and half of the people in need of treatment can purchase an 
antiretroviral if it is priced at $92. In order to sell to all people with HIV/AIDS 
who need treatment, the price would have to be lowered to $18 per patient 
per year. 27
Figure 4 shows the total sales revenue a firm will gain if it sells at each price on 
figure 3 South Africa ARV demand 
if price = 5% income.




the demand curve. The firm maximizes its sales in South Africa by selling at the 
price that only the top 10 percent can afford. If the firm lowers its price to what 20 
percent can afford ($396), it will sell twice as many at a price far less than half the 
profit-maximizing price, earning substantially less ($79.2 million compared with 
$148.1 million in total revenue). If the monopoly firm continues to cut prices to 
raise sales volume, revenues fall further. In other words, at this level of wealth 
inequality in a society, the firm maximizes profit by setting a price that at least 90 
percent of people in need cannot afford.
 To understand the effect that inequality in income distribution has on the pric-
ing and output decisions of a monopolist, compare the South African case with 
that of Norway, which has one of the most equitable income distributions.28 Here, 
the demand curve would be much flatter, as shown in figure 5.
figure 5 Norway ARV demand 
if price = 5% income.




 As shown in figure 6, under the same assumptions as the South Africa case 
above, that is, that a person will buy the essential product at 5 percent of income, 
the firm makes more money in Norway by selling more products at lower prices at 
each step along the income distribution until the firm serves between 80 percent 
and 90 percent of the population.
 The lesson is this: The more unequal the distribution of income is in a country, 
the more people will be excluded from the market (what economists call “dead-
weight loss”) when a monopoly practices profit-maximizing pricing strategies for 
an essential good. At the same time, because sales in such a country are likely to 
be so few (making sales only to the very top income earners), the monopoly does 
not enjoy very high levels of overall profits. In other words, in countries with high 
income inequality, unrestrained monopoly pricing of essential goods is very likely 
to cause large social harms and comparatively small incentives to invest in innova-
tive activities. In this context, it becomes an incredibly persuasive economic argu-
ment that whatever duties to promote competition and restrain monopoly pricing 
power exist, they should have their strongest application.
post-trips	competition	law	advocacy	by	the	a2k	movement
In September 2002, the access-to-medicines movement took a decisive turn when, 
in South Africa, A2K advocates began to use competition law to advance their 
cause. South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) shifted the focus of its 
advocacy for access to medicines to the South African Competition Commission. 
At the time, TAC and other access campaigners around the world were working 
to increase access to an important first-line AIDS drug regime commonly used 
in developing countries at that time. The cocktail—composed of the drugs AZT 
and 3TC, both patented by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), and Nevirapine, patented by 
Boehringer Ingelheim (BI)—was being priced in the late 1990s in South Africa and 
around the world for over $10,000 per patient per year. That price was about three 
times the GDP per capita in South Africa. By the time of the complaint, prices in 
South Africa had fallen to about $3,000 a year for the same cocktail, compared 
with under $300 a year for generic versions from Indian firms. Indian companies 
also produced the medicines in a single-pill format, which was unavailable from 
the patent holders.
 There had been previous requests for licenses by Indian pharmaceutical pro-
ducer Cipla and from the medical services NGO Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
both of which were rejected by the companies. BI admitted in documents filed in 
the South African Competition Commission that it had a general policy to refuse 
licenses for the generic supply of its products. The health minister had authority 
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to issue authorizations for the use of generic versions of patented medicines for 
public-health purposes, but the Department of Health refused requests to use the 
law, leaving TAC searching for a new forum in which to bring its advocacy.
 The complaint filed by TAC with the Competition Commission in 2002 alleged 
that the use of the patents by multinational pharmaceutical companies to demand 
prices that only a sliver of South Africa’s population could afford violated section 
8(a) of the South African Competition Act, which states that it is prohibited for 
a dominant firm to charge an “excessive price,” defined as a price that is higher 
than the “reasonable economic value” of the good and that is to the detriment 
of consumers. In essence, this was a core/periphery complaint, asking the com-
mission to leave the basic right of the company to refuse to license intact, but 
defining a periphery of pricing excess that is beyond the scope of the patent 
grant. A subsequent submission by the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) 
(now known as Knowledge Ecology International) encouraged the commission to 
adopt the concept of essential intellectual property. CPTech argued that whenever 
“(1) the number of people who need access to the medicines to prolong their life or 
improve their health significantly exceeds those with access to the drug, and (2) a 
substantial barrier to access is price,” a legal burden “shift[s] to the pharmaceutical 
company to prove that it has promoted competitive pricing by issuing licenses of 
right to all qualified suppliers on reasonable terms.”29
 In October 2003, the commission announced that it found three abuses of dom-
inance under Article 8 of the Act: excessive pricing, refusing to give a competitor 
access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do so, and engag-
ing in exclusionary conduct if the anticompetitive effect of that act outweighs its 
technological, efficiency, or other procompetitive gains. Menzi Simelane, commis-
sioner at the Competition Commission, explained:
Our investigation revealed that each of the firms has refused to license their patents 
to generic manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty. We believe that this is 
feasible and that consumers will benefit from cheaper generic versions of the drugs 
concerned. We further believe that granting licenses would provide for competition 
between firms and their generic competitors.
 We will request the Tribunal to make an order authorising any person to exploit 
the patents to market generic versions of the respondents patented medicines or 
fixed dose combinations that require these patents, in return for the payment of a 
reasonable royalty.30
 Soon after the Commission’s announcement, the two pharmaceutical compa-
nies settled the complaints through agreements requiring the issuance of multiple 
licenses to South African and Indian generic producers who now supply dramatically 
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cheaper versions of the medications in South Africa, including in fixed dose combi-
nations. The licenses also authorized exports to all of sub-Saharan Africa.
 Other access campaigns have used competition law to achieve other objectives. 
In February 2007, Knowledge Ecology International filed a complaint in the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission alleging that Gilead Science Incorporated was illegally 
using restrictive licensing policies, including banning licensees from serving some 
countries and charging royalties for countries where it did not have patents.31 In 
Thailand, treatment activists filed a competition complaint against Abbott Labora-
tories for refusing to supply new drugs in the country to punish the government 
for issuing a compulsory license on the AIDS drug Kaletra.32 In the West, com-
petition-law cases were used successfully to open access to Microsoft’s applica-
tion programming interfaces for Internet browsers, and complaints have been filed 
to open access to the digital-rights-management software used to prevent iTunes 
music from being played on competing players.33
 In these and other cases, the A2K movement has used the forum and language 
of competition law for strategic advantage. Some of these advantages exist regard-
less of the end result of the complaint. Rhetorically, the move allows A2K cam-
paigns to shift the dominant frame for analyzing the issue from one of the protec-
tion of the intellectual property holder’s “rights” to one of monopoly regulation. 
Institutionally, competition law strategies allow the A2K movement to shift into 
regimes with investigative resources and institutional cultures that are often wary 
of barriers to competition. Doing so also is a way to alter the terms of the political 
debate over access-to-knowledge issues.
reframing	political	debate
Research from the cognitive and social sciences shows us that people interpret 
ideas and issues through existing frames and concepts that are culturally con-
structed and historically situated. This research suggests that it is important for 
policy advocates to focus on how people are thinking about a particular issue, 
rather than attempting only to change the amount of information they are using to 
reach conclusions. Social movements often engage in advocacy that reflects these 
teachings by reframing issues, that is, by “conscious, strategic efforts by groups 
of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action.”34
 The communications strategies of the dominant intellectual property industries 
show great attention to the importance of framing in their campaigns to ratchet up 
intellectual property protection around the globe. As discussed above, historically, 
patents and other intellectual property were viewed by the public and government 
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officials as a form of monopoly that needed to be regulated to prevent abuse and 
to serve the greater public interest. The intellectual property industries very delib-
eratively and strategically shifted this frame to one of “property rights.” Susan Sell 
explains:
The language of rights weighs in favor of the person claiming the right. The lan-
guage of privilege weighs in favor of the person granting the privilege. By wrapping 
themselves in the mantle of “property rights,” they suggested that the rights they 
were claiming were somehow natural, unassailable and automatically deserved. 
They were able to deploy “rights talk” effectively in part because they were operat-
ing in a context in which property rights are revered. In that regard “rights talk” 
resonated with broader American culture. . . . The advocates of highly protectionist 
IP norms expressed indignation at those violating these “rights” and claimed that 
so-called violators were “pirates.”35�
 Filing complaints in competition tribunals shifts the discourse back to the 
monopoly frame, where consumers hold an advantage. While the language of rights 
suggests deserving protection from state regulation, modern culture continues to 
be highly distrustful of monopolies. The term is synonymous with exploitation and 
abuse. Monopolies are entities to be regulated, not freed from state intervention.
 The use of competition forums to shift the framing of intellectual property 
issues is evident in some of the A2K movement’s advocacy documents and expla-
nations of their strategies. In a statement on the day it filed complaints against 
GSK and BI, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) explained that the TAC submis-
sion showed that “largely as a result . . . of monopoly abuse, the pharmaceutical 
industry remains the most profitable industry in the world” and that “GSK con-
tinues to expand their profit margins by charging excessive prices for life-saving 
medicines in markets in which many people living with HIV/AIDS [have] little or 
no income.”36� Similarly, one of TAC’s attorneys explained that the use of a com-
petition law strategy was selected in part because of a perceived “need to revive 
the public debate about patent abuse and profiteering,”37 which the competition 
forum enabled.� Using competition law is thus important not only for the potential 
remedies one may achieve there, but because it helps a movement communicate to 
the greater public about an issue.
 Another discursive advantage of using competition law is that it is punitive. 
Other TRIPS flexibilities, for example a general public-interest license, are often 
discretionary and do not necessarily brand the intellectual property holder as a 
bad actor. Using competition laws shifts the inquiry from whether the government 
should use its discretion to limit patent rents to whether the company deserves 
punishment for its abusive actions.
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 The importance of a punitive framework proved particularly evident in the 
Thai case against Abbott Laboratories. In that case, Abbott withdrew drug-regis-
tration applications for several drugs after the Thai government issued a compul-
sory license to authorize generic purchases of one of Abbott’s AIDS drugs. Abbot 
claimed in the press that the Thai compulsory license was illegal. Health activists 
responded with a competition complaint against Abbott for the withdrawal of 
needed supplies for the Thai market, thus branding Abbott as the true illegal actor. 
Treatment campaigner and law professor Brook Baker explained in The Nation 
newspaper: “Instead of Thailand breaking the law, it is Abbott that has engaged 
in an unprecedented and probably illegal withdrawal from the Thai market, tak-
ing seven important medicines, including a heat-stable form of Kaletra, out of the 
drug registration process.”38�
 Another framing advantage of competition proceedings is that they commonly 
provide a calendar of proceedings around which media and advocacy events can be 
staged. Unlike general public-interest licenses, which often lack set procedures or 
precedents, competition procedures are normally defined by regulations with set 
points for decision and input. The filing of a complaint, the filing of a response by 
the companies, a public hearing, the decision by the agency, a formal complaint or 
appeal to a tribunal, and so on, all become moments when public attention can be 
brought to bear on the complaint and focused on the story of illegal action and abuse 
told by activists. The proceedings may also produce documents and statements 
through the investigation that can be obtained through freedom of information laws 
and used in subsequent campaigns to explain industry dealings in the country.
regime	shifting	into	competition	forums
The concept of framing focuses on the strategic use of discourse to alter public per-
ceptions of and reactions to an issue. By contrast, regime shifting, a concept from 
political science and international relations, is a strategy that attempts to alter the 
status quo ante by moving law-making initiatives and standard-setting activities 
from one venue into another.39� Here, advocacy groups seek out forums that may 
be more hospitable to their cause. Regime shifting and framing often go hand in 
hand. One benefit of effectively reframing an issue is that it may open the pos-
sibilities of action in new forums. Reframing intellectual property issues as trade 
issues enabled the dominant intellectual property industries to shift the forum for 
international intellectual property law-making initiatives from the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) into the WTO. Access campaigners responded 
by reframing pharmaceutical patents as a public-health issue, enabling the engage-
ment of the World Health Organization (WHO) in intellectual property debates. 
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Framing intellectual property as a monopoly-regulation issue opens the potential 
for advocacy in competition law forums. These forums offer potential institutional 
advantages in developing countries, where laws are new and undefined.
 The opportunities for competition law advocacy in the Global South arise 
from the flip side of economic liberalization that is exporting intellectual prop-
erty restrictions and deregulation to much of the developing world. Based on the 
dominant Western model of liberalization, the “free markets” created by contract 
and property rights and by deregulated industries are supposed to be regulated to 
serve public interests primarily by competition law. Only a handful of developing 
countries had such laws before 1990. In the decade between 1990 and 2000, the 
same decade that witnessed the globalization of substantive intellectual property 
laws through the TRIPS Agreement (1994), fifty countries (most of them develop-
ing) added competition laws to their books. (See table 1.)
 Although competition law is rapidly globalizing, it is not doing so in a uniform 
way. Unlike in intellectual property law, where binding minimum standards are 
established by the TRIPS Agreement, in competition law, countries remain largely 
free from any international obligation to draft, interpret, and enforce standards 
in any particular manner. Indeed, although U.S. and European Union laws are the 
obvious models for the substantive doctrines contained in most of the world’s 
competition statutes, there are very noteworthy differences in the interpretive 
norms and policies that animate the laws of many developing countries.
 Competition laws in developing countries often explicitly incorporate develop-
mental objectives. For example, the South African Competition Act expresses the 
intent to create a competitive economic environment “focussed on development” 
in order to “advance the social and economic welfare,” “to correct structural imbal-
ances and past economic injustices,” and “to reduce the uneven development, 
inequality and absolute poverty which is so prevalent in South Africa.” The South 
African Competition Commission found these norms persuasive in determining the 
outcome of the complaint against GSK and BI, explaining: “Indeed the very goals 
of our Competition Act—promoting development, providing consumers with com-
petitive prices and product choices, advancing social and economic welfare and 
correcting structural imbalances—have been made difficult in this context by the 
refusal of the respondents to license patents.”40
 Injunctions to consider equity objectives in the interpretation and enforcement 
of competition law may be heightened in countries that have adopted social and 
economic rights in their constitutions. To take South Africa as an example again, 
the constitution obligates the state to “promote the achievement of equality” and 
to “take reasonable legislative and other means” to realize the rights of everyone 
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promoting these rights, enjoining every court and agency to “promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” whenever “interpreting any legislation, 
and when developing the common law.” In the context of structural market prob-
lems that create incentives for providers of essential goods to exclude the majority 
of people in need from their products, promotion of the right to access to health 
care and the achievement of equality may counsel for interpretations of competi-
tion law favorable to access to intellectual property rights.
 Making use of competition commissions is another regime-shifting strategy 
that is particularly well suited to promoting access to knowledge in developing 
countries. One of the very helpful attributes of Western competition laws that has 
been exported to many developing countries is the competition-advocacy agency. 
The role of these agencies is to receive complaints from competitors and consum-
ers about potentially illegal practices, to investigate them using professional staffs 
and special legal authority (such as subpoena power), and to litigate complaints on 
behalf of the consumers or the state, often in a specialized tribunal.
 In many countries, these agencies are relatively well funded. Aid programs 
from the United States and Europe support the institutional capacity of competi-
tion authorities as part of packages aimed at promoting the liberalization of econo-
mies. The agencies often have the capacity to hire top lawyers, economists, and 
other professionals. And because the laws themselves are often relatively new, 
these staffs may not be too overburdened with work to do a professional job in 
their investigations.
 The availability of an advocacy agency may enable an access campaign to 
mount a highly technical legal campaign against a well-resourced intellectual prop-
erty owner without the kind of legal war chest that such a battle would require 
on their own. Resources must still be spent on convincing the agency to act and 
on educating the agency about technical, medical, and intellectual property top-
ics with which it may not be familiar. The mobilization of political resources may 
also be necessary to convince leaders with influence over the agency to prod it to 
act with sufficient determination. But where competition authorities are inclined 
to act in the greater public interest, their professional lawyers and staff can be 
extremely valuable additions to the resources of an access movement.
 Finally, the decisions of competition courts and commissions may have a last-
ing precedential effect, altering the assumed background rules in the industry. This 
is evident in South Africa. Where BI once openly proclaimed a policy of not licens-
ing generic companies to provide its products, industry lawyers now counsel that 
blanket refusals to license patents on AIDS drugs are legally suspect and open to 
challenge.41 The precedent has similarly been relied upon by treatment activists, 
including a subsequent complaint against the pharmaceutical giant Merck, alleging 
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that licenses granted for the AIDS drug efavirenz do not license the lowest-cost 
suppliers and do not allow new fixed-dose combinations.42
conclusion
Courts and agencies can and do use competition law to help strike the balance 
between the aims of intellectual property laws to promote investment and innova-
tion and competition law goals to maximize consumer welfare through competi-
tive markets and lower prices. Where a developing country chooses to strike this 
balance may—and should—differ markedly from how the balance is struck in the 
Global North. Economic analysis suggests that rules should be drawn in develop-
ing countries to much more heavily favor open access to intellectual property on 
essential goods and services where the welfare implications of allowing exclusive 
dealing appear enormous.
 No strategy is without risks, and there are significant risks to pursuing com-
petition law strategies to open access to intellectual property. Many of the risks 
involved with competition law strategies are the flip side of the benefits. The fact 
that competition strategies can create legal precedents that will affect later cases 
means that losses in this forum can have lasting negative repercussions. The inde-
terminacy of law that provides opportunities for progressive legal movements also 
provides a fluid medium within which industry lawyers can work. The institutional 
structure of the dominant model of competition law, with a well-resourced advo-
cacy agency as a gatekeeper to courts, may be a barrier to progressive use of the 
law if it is staffed with conservative bureaucrats. Finally, the opportunities for 
relying on Northern precedent should not be overstated: no Northern court has 
held that essential drug patents are subject to open-licensing duties.
 The experiences in South Africa and other countries are showing that competi-
tion agencies can be valuable sites for political struggle over how intellectual prop-
erty will be regulated. Such sites offer many advantages for access communities 
and should certainly be considered in any access campaign. But as with any site of 
struggle, the likelihood of success will depend on contextual circumstances: who 
will make the decision, what leverage movements have over the decision maker, 
and how successfully tactics are executed to leverage ideological and political 
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